

Message Text

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ACTION ARA-20

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03

SS-20 USIA-15 IO-14 DRC-01 /135 W

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R 301600Z MAY 74

FM AMCONSUL PARAMARIBO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1670

INFO AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN

AMEMBASSY CARACAS

AMCONSUL CURACAO

AMCONSUL MARTINIQUE

USCINCSO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 PARAMARIBO 252

GEORGETOWN ALSO FOR PAO

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGOV, NS, NL

SUBJECT: REALM SUMMIT PROTOCOL AND OUTLOOK FOR INDEPENDENCE

REF: THE HAGUE 2613

1. SUMMARY. THE PROTOCOL PRODUCED BY THE REALM "SUMMIT" IS AN IMPORTANT FIRST STEP TOWARDS SURINAM'S INDEPENDENCE BY THE END OF 1975. MOST KEY ISSUES ARE AS YET UNRESOLVED AND SOME MAY BE LEFT FOR SOLUTION UNTIL AFTER INDEPENDENCE. NEVERTHELESS, THE OUTLOOK IS THAT THE PRESENT GOS, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE GON, WILL SUCCESSFULLY BRING THE NEW STATE INTO EXISTENCE BY THE TIME STIPULATED. END SUMMARY.

2. THE PROTOCOL ISSUED FOLLOWING THE REALM SUMMIT IS THE FIRST CONCRETE STEP TOWARDS SURINAM'S ATTAINMENT OF INDEPENDENCE BY END 1975 SINCE PRIME MINISTER ARRON PROPOSED THAT GOAL ON FEBRUARY 15. THE PROTOCOL PROVIDES FURTHER EVIDENCE
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OF THE GON'S DESIRE TO ASSIST AND ENCOURAGE THE GOS TO ACHIEVE

THAT GOAL.

3. THE PROTOCOL PROVIDES A USEFUL FRAMEWORK WHICH OUTLINES PROBLEMS TO BE RESOLVED AND WITHIN WHICH SOLUTIONS CAN BE WORKED OUT. THERE IS AS YET LITTLE AGREEMENT WITHIN THE GOS REGARDING SOME OF THE BASIC QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED AND FEW INDICATIONS THAT THEY HAVE BEEN THOUGHT THROUGH. FOR EXAMPLE, WHETHER SURINAM SHOULD FORM PART OF A COMMON-WEALTH OR BECOME AN INDEPENDENT REPUBLIC IS STILL AN OPEN QUESTION. ASIDE FROM FORM, SUCH KEY QUESTIONS AS NATIONALITY AND IMMIGRATION RIGHTS SEEM HARDLY TO HAVE BEEN EXPLORED BY GOS POLICY MAKERS, EVEN INsofar AS WHAT IS IN SURINAM'S NATIONAL INTEREST. MILITANTLY NATIONALIST ELEMENTS OF THE GOS FAVOR A SEPARATE NATIONALITY, A SHARP RESTRICTION OF MIGRATION TO HOLLAND, AND MEASURES TO ENCOURAGE THE RETURN OF MANY OR MOST OF THE 80,000 SURINAMERS ESTIMATED TO BE NOW LIVING IN HOLLAND, A POSITION WHICH THE GON IS LIKELY TO SHARE. OTHER GOS POLITICIANS, RESPONSIVE TO THE UNEXPRESSED BUT CLEAR DESIRES OF MOST SURINAMERS, WOULD PREFER EASY ACCESS TO HOLLAND FOR SURINAMERS, INCLUDING CONTINUED ECONOMICAL CABOTAGE AIR TRAVEL RATES.

4. OFFICIAL THINKING ON DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS IS STILL UNFORMED. PROPOSALS RANGE FROM RELIANCE ON A GON-GOS MUTUAL DEFENSE AGREEMENT WITH NO SURINAM ARMED FORCE, TO A LARGE PARAMILITARY NATIONAL SERVICE BODY DESIGNED TO PROVIDE NATIONAL DEFENSE, SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT AND CONSERVATION, PROVIDE VOCATIONAL TRAINING, AND TAKE UNEMPLOYED YOUTH OFF THE STREETS, AMONG OTHER TASKS. THIS LATTER CONCEPT IS CHARACTERIZED BY NETHERLANDS ARMY OFFICERS HERE, WHO CONSIDER IT IMPRACTICAL, AS "A SHEEP WITH FIVE LEGS." A PNR-SUPPORTED PROPOSAL, WHICH SEEMS MORE REALISTIC, ENVISAGES A SMALL, LIGHTLY ARMED PROFESSIONAL FORCE OF PERHAPS 400 MEN INCLUDING SUPPORTING SERVICES, WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FOR SOME DEFENSE CAPABILITY, BORDER CONTROL, AND A ROVING PRESENCE IN THE INTERIOR, AT AN ACCEPTABLE COST. THE PNR CONCEPT WOULD FURTHER PROVIDE FOR DISPERSION OF POLICE-MILITARY POWER BY REMOVING THE CID SPECIAL BRANCH UNIT FROM THE POLICE, AND OUT OF THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE AND POLICE, TO THE MINISTRY OF GENERAL AFFAIRS, WHILE THE MILITARY FORCE WOULD BE CONSTITUTED UNDER STILL ANOTHER ALREADY EXISTING

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MINISTRY, PROBABLY THAT OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THE PNR SCHEME SEEMS TO ENJOY THE UNOFFICIAL FAVOR OF THE DUTCH MILITARY IN SURINAM AND IS THE MOST CAREFULLY THOUGHT OUT PLAN.

5. DURING THE 3-DAY SUMMIT PRIME MINISTER ARRON REPORTEDLY ASKED THE GON FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO CREATE A SURINAM ARMED FORCE, TO INCLUDE THE POSSIBLE CONTINUANCE IN SURINAM FOR SOME TIME OF DUTCH MILITARY ELEMENTS AFTER INDEPENDENCE.

ARRON SPECIFIED THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THESE ELEMENTS WOULD BE PURELY EXTERNAL DEFENSE AND NOT TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL ORDER. GOS MINISTERS HERE HAVE SPOKEN OF THE DESIRABILITY OF HAVING DUTCH OFFICERS WITH THE SURINAM ARMED FORCE UNTIL SUCH TIME AS SURINAM OFFICERS CAN BE TRAINED, OR UNTIL DUTKH OFFICERS OF SURINAM ORIGIN CAN BE ENTICED AWAY FROM THE BROADER CAREER PERSPECTIVES THEY NOW ENJOY IN THE DUTCH ARMY.

6. THE EXTENT OF HOLLAND'S OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE SEEMS TO BE MOVING TOWARD A CLEARER DEFINITION THAN OTHER KEY QUESTIONS. THE GON'S ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IN THE PROTOCOL THAT IT "MAINTAINS SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY WITH RESPECT TO SURINAM'S DEVELOPMENT EVEN AFTER INDEPENDENCE AND ACCEPTS CONSEQUENCES ENSUING FROM THIS RESPONSIBILITY" IS THE FIRST FORMAL GON RECOGNITION, AS FAR AS THE POST IS AWARE, OF A SPECIAL DUTCH RESPONSIBILITY OVER AND ABOVE WHAT THE NETHERLANDS MIGHT FEEL FOR ANY OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRY. REASSURING ALSO IS GON DEVELOPMENT MINISTER PRONK'S RECENT STATEMENT ON DUTCH TV PROGRAM BRANDPUNT, AS REPORTED HERE, THAT ALTHOUGH HE COULD NOT NAME AN EXACT SUM - THIS WOULD DEPEND ON THE DEVELOPMENT PLAN - HOLLAND WOULD CONTINUE TO PROVIDE THE SAME LEVEL OF ASSISTANCE AS HERETOFORE, ABOUT NF120 MILLION ANNUALLY. PRONK ALSO SAID WHAT MANY CRITICS OF THE DUTCH-FINANCED SURINAM DEVELOPMENT PLAN HAVE LONG SAID PRIVATELY - AND WHAT THIS POST HAS REPORTED OVER RECENT YEARS - THAT ASSISTANCE PROVIDED UNDER PREVIOUS GOVERNMENTS WAS BADLY ORGANIZED AND POORLY EMPLOYED.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 PARAMARIBO 252

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7. THE VHP OPPOSITION IN THE STATEN HAS ALREADY BEGUN TO ATTACK THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT AND DUTCH PROMISES. VHP PARLIAMENTARIAN HINDORIE HAS POINTED OUT THAT PRONK'S STATEMENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A GUARANTEE AND, IN ANY EVENT, A COMMITMENT BY THE PRESENT GON MIGHT NOT BE HONORED BY A GON WHICH SOME FUTURE ELECTION IN HOLLAND MIGHT PRODUCE. HINDORIE, SOMETHING OF AN EXPERT ON DEVELOPMENT AID, LIKES TO POINT OUT THAT GIVEN SURINAM'S RELATIVELY HIGH PER CAPITA GNP OF DOLS 783 (1971), SOME FUTURE GON WILL QUESTION THE NEED FOR SUCH A HIGH LEVEL OF AID COMPARED WITH OTHER LDC'S WITH ONLY A FRACTION OF THIS INCOME. VHP SPOKESMEN HAVE ALSO HEAVILY ATTACKED THE LACK OF ANY MENTION IN THE PROTOCOL OF A GON GUARANTEE FOR "HUMAN RIGHTS" IN SURINAM AFTER INDEPENDENCE. THIS VHP DEMAND IS BASED ON HINDUSTANI FEARS OF RACIAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

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POLITICAL OPPRESSION BY A BLACK GOVERNMENT, SIMILAR TO WHAT THE VHP CLAIMS HAS HAPPENED IN GUYANA. GENERAL AMIN'S TREATMENT OF INDIANS IN UGANDA IS ALSO FREQUENTLY CITED. WHILE HINDUSTANI FEARS OF BLACK OPPRESSION ARE IN PART REAL, THE VHP HAS PLAYED HEAVILY ON THESE FEARS IN ITS ELECTORAL PROPAGANDA, ESPECIALLY AMONG HINDUSTANIS IN RURAL AREAS WHERE THE BASE OF VHP SUPPORT IS LOCATED, PREDICTING WIDESPREAD RAPE, LOOTING AND VIOLENCE BY BLACKS FOLLOWING INDEPENDENCE. SHOULD THE VHP LEADERSHIP DECIDE TO ABANDON ITS SO FAR UNPRODUCTIVE POLICY OF TOTAL AND UNCOMPROMISING OPPOSITION TO INDEPENDENCE IN THE PROXIMATE FUTURE, IT IS LIKELY TO FIND ITSELF A PRISONER OF ITS OWN ELECTORAL PROPAGANDA.

8. VHP CHAIRMAN LACHMON ALSO ASSAILED A STATEMENT BY GON PRIME MINISTER DEN UYL DURING THE EUMMIT THAT THE GON WOULD DEAL ONLY WITH THE GOS AND WOULD "NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT" THE POSITION OF THE OPPOSITION ON INDEPENDENCE. DEN UYL, ACCORDING TO A RELIABLE REPORT, TOLD LACHMON AS MUCH IN A PRIVATE MEETING DURING DEN UYL'S VISIT TO SURINAM IN FEBRUARY, DURING WHICH LACHMON TRIED TO PERSUADE DEN UYL TO POSTPONE

INDEPENDENCE FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. DENUYL TOLD LACHMON BLUNTLY THAT THE GON WOULD NOT LIFT A FINGER TO SLOW THE PACE.

9. LACHMON HAS NOT GIVEN UP. DESPITE THE PRIVATELY EXPRESSED MISGIVINGS OF SUCH CLOSE ASSOCIATES AS HINDORIE AND FORMER JUSTICE MINISTER ADHIN, WHO BELIEVE THAT A MORE FLEXIBLE POLICY OF DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT COULD PRODUCE SOME DELAY, AND ALSO INFLUENCE THE CONDITIONS OF INDEPENDENCE WHEN IT COMES. IN THE FIRST INSTANCE LACHMON APPARENTLY PLANS TO BLOCK INDEPENDENCE IN THE STATEN, SINCE THE GOVERNMENT LACKS - BY ONE VOTE - THE TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY WHICH LACHMON CLAIMS IT NEEDS TO ALTER THE STATUTE. SOME SURINAM AND DUTCH JURISTS DISAGREE WITH HIM ON THIS INTERPRETATION. IF PARLIAMENTARY MEANS FAIL THEN, LACHMON SAYS, "OTHER POSSIBILITIES CAN BE EXPLORED." LACHMON HAS OFTEN SPOKEN OF AN APPEAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND ONE OF HIS TOP AIDES, PARLIAMENTARIAN ALVIN MUNGRA, HAS RECENTLY PROPOSED PUBLICALLY THAT IN THE EVENT OF INDEPENDENCE WEST SURINAM, WHICH HAS A HEAVY HINDUSTANI MAJORITY, SHOULD SECEDE FROM SURINAM AND REMAIN WITHIN THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS. ANOTHER RUMORED POSSIBILITY IS ECONOMIC SABOTAGE, PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL

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BY WITHHOLDING RICE AND OTHER PRODUCE FROM THE MARKET. THESE EXTRAPARLIAMENTARY STEPS ARE VIEWED BY MOST OBSERVERS AS INEFFECTIVE OR IMPRACTICAL, AND AS INDICATIONS OF LACHMON'S INCREASINGLY UNREALISTIC ATTITUDE.

10. MEANWHILE, THE VHP IS CONTINUING TO ATTEMPT TO EXPLOIT DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE NPK COALITION IN ORDER TO ENGINEER MAJOR DEFECTIONS. LACHMON CLAIMS PRIVATELY THAT HE CAN COUNT ON THE JAVANESE KTPI, WHICH HAS TWO MINISTERS AND ONE SEAT IN THE STATEN, AND THAT HE HAS GOOD POSSIBILITIES ELSEWHERE, PROBABLY IN THE RIGHT WING OF THE NPS. THE POST'S EVALUATION IS THAT, BARRING SOME UNFORESEEN AND UNLIKELY MISSTEP IN THE NPK COALITION, LACHMON WILL NOT SUCCEED IN BRINGING ABOUT ANY SIGNIFICANT DEFECTIONS. THE VHP HAS ATTEMPTED TO CAPITALIZE ON SOME NERVOUSNESS WITHIN THE NPK-COALITION OVER THE IMPORTANT POSITION WHICH THE LEFTIST PNR HAS ASSUMED. THE PNR HOWEVER WILL PROBABLY GO MORE THAN HALFWAY TO AVOID THE POSSIBILITY OF A SPLIT. PLANS FOR PNR CHAIRMAN EDDY BRUMA, ALSO ECONOMICS MINISTER, TO ACCOMPANY ARRON TO THE HAGUE SUMMIT MEETING WERE SHELVED AT THE LAST MOMENT TO AVOID ADDING FUEL TO VHP CHARGES THAT ARRON IS UNDER BRUMA'S INFLUENCE.

11. THE OUTLOOK IS THAT SURINAM WILL BECOME INDEPENDENT BEFORE THE END OF 1975. THE GOS IS DETERMINED THAT THIS BE SO AND THIS GOVERNMENT WILL PROBABLY LAST LONG ENOUGH TO BRING INDEPENDENCE ABOUT BY THAT TIME. THE GON IS CLEARLY DISPOSED TO REMOVE EVERY OBSTACLE TO THAT OBJECTIVE. IT IS

QUITE LIKELY THAT ALL OF THE IMPORTANT ISSUES WILL NOT BE RESOLVED BEFORE INDEPENDENCE BUT THE ATTITUDE OF THE GOS IS THAT THESE MATTERS CAN BE SETTLED AFTER INDEPENDENCE. THE SITUATION IS BEST SUMMED UP BY A REPORTED STATEMENT BY ARRON AT A PRESS CONFERENCE DURING THE SUMMIT: SURINAM WILL BECOME INDEPENDENT BY END 1975 "ONE WAY OR ANOTHER (HOE DAN OOK)."

12. WE WILL OBTAIN MORE BACKGROUND ON THE HAGUE SUMMIT UPON ARRON'S RETURN TO SURINAM.
JOHNSTON

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